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Abstract
We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games
in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic
games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and
the random removal values. The main characteristic of these proposals is that they
always select a unique payo¤ allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value
coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen, 1989) for hyperplane
games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley, 1953). The random re-
moval coincides with the solidarity value (Novak and Radzik, 1994) in TU-games.
In large games it is showed that, in the special class of market games, the ran-
dom marginal coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley,1969), and that the
random removal coincides with the equal split solution.
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1 Introduction
In this paper n-person cooperative games in coalitional form are considered.
When utility is transferable across players (TU-games) the most prominent solution
concept is the Shapley (1953) value. It yields a unique payo¤ allocation for the players in
the game. Shapleys original support for the value was axiomatic. Other relevant axioma-
tizations of the value are in Myerson (1980), and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). Bargaining
models that yield the value in the TU-case have also been proposed. Among these one
should mention Gul (1989), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a), Winter
(1994), and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
When utility is not transferable (NTU-games), di¤erent ways to extend the value
have been considered. The most relevant are by Harsanyi (1963), Shapley (1969)1, and
Maschler and Owen (1992)2. These three solutions were constructed in such a way that
they coincide with the Nash (1950) solution for pure bargaining games and with the
Shapley value for TU-games. Axiomatic support for these solutions have been carried out
by Aumann (1985) for the Shapley NTU-solution, by Hart (1985) for the Harsanyi NTU-
solution, and by de Clippel, Peters and Zank (2004) and by Hart (2005) for the Consistent
NTU-solution. Bargaining games that support these solutions have been proposed for
the Consistent NTU-solution in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), and for the Shapley NTU-
1The Shapley NTU-value is also known as -transfer value.
2First introduced for hyperplane games in Maschler and Owen (1989), and also called the Consistent
NTU-value.
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solution in Vidal-Puga (2006)3.
This paper starts o¤ with two aspects that should be taken into account in this value
extension program: Single-valuedness and symmetry. Recall that both, the Shapley value
and the Nash bargaining solution, satisfy symmetry and select single payo¤s in TU-
games, and pure bargaining games, respectively. Nevertheless, the Harsanyi, Shapley,
and Consistent NTU-solutions do not guarantee uniqueness in the solution set.
Multiplicity of the outcomes is not a real problem if we interpret a solution from a
predictive point of view. When a set is selected, that only means that the nal outcome
must belong to this solution set. This phenomenon happens in many other contexts, as
in the Walrasian equilibria in competitive economic models, or in the Nash equilibria
and many of its renements for non-cooperative games. But from a normative point
of view, this multiplicity in the solution set yields an inconsistency with respect to the
symmetry axiom which belongs to the set of axioms that supports both the Shapley
TU-value, and the Nash bargaining solution: It is easy to build examples4 of symmetric
games for which asymmetric payo¤s are selected by these three solutions. Where do these
asymmetries come from? Perhaps a more detailed and explicit model of the bargaining
rules that support each solution should be needed in order to understand the origin of
these asymmetric payo¤s.
From this strategic approach, the only relevant proposal is the bargaining procedure
proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). This model is an elegant and simple variation
of the alternating o¤ers method. It has the merit that it supports the Nash bargaining
solution for pure bargaining games, the Shapley value for TU-games, and the Consistent
solution for NTU-games. In brief, the model goes as follows:
3Only for the particular case in which the boundary of the grand coalition is a hyperplane.
4See Section 3 wherea two-person example is used extensively.
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Among the players5 still in the bargaining, a proposer is chosen randomly (with uni-
form distribution). The proposer makes a feasible o¤er. If the rest of the players agree, this
o¤er is the nal payo¤. If any player rejects, with a prespecied probability  (0   < 1),
a new proposer is chosen (among all of them) and the process is repeated again, and with
probability (1   ) the proposer drops out of the game (receiving zero) and we restart
the bargaining process with the remaining players, and so on. The process starts initially
with all players.
This bargaining procedure is a sequential, perfect information game, and it has a
stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Moreover, when the probability  goes to one, the
solution payo¤s associated to the equilibria converge to the consistent values. Moreover,
in the same paper, some variations of this bargaining game are considered. And they
obtain, in the authorswords, ...in particular, we allow for the possibility that players
other than the proposer may be the victims of bargaining breakdown. However, we show
that if the bargaining procedure yields the Shapley value in the TU-case, then necessarily
the consistent value obtains in the NTU-case. Thus the consistent NTU-value is, according
to our noncooperative approach, the appropriate generalization of the Shapley TU-value.
End of story?
First of all, note that this bargaining model does not yield a full support of the set
of consistent payo¤ allocations, i.e. there are examples with consistent payo¤ allocations
that cannot be approached (when  ! 1) with the payo¤s associated to the stationary
subgame perfect equilibria. This fact will be shown by the example discussed in Section
3: In this symmetric game there are three consistent payo¤s, two of them asymmetric and
only one symmetric. The asymmetric points are the only ones that can be approached
5From now on, we interpret players in a game as agents with neutral gender. They can be interpreted
as automata, institutions or so on. Therefore we will avoid choosing their gender every time.
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by the equilibrium payo¤s, with just the symmetric payo¤ being excluded.
There is a crucial step in the design of the negotiation model that is responsible for
this asymmetry, and we can enunciate it by using the same authorswords:
The key modeling issue is the specication of what happens if there is no agreement
and, as a consequence, the game moves to the next stage. It is at this point that subgroups
are made to matter by allowing for the possibility of partial breakdown of negotiations.
Clearly, there are many ways to model such a partial breakdown. In the body of this paper
we concentrate on a particular and simple class: disagreement puts only the proposer in
jeopardy. That is, after his proposal is rejected, the proposer may cease to be an active
participant.
Note that the cause of a rejection is due to the fact that the proposer o¤ers less
than what the responder expect to obtain. But who is the player responsible for such a
breakdown? The proposer, o¤ering too little, or the responder rejecting the o¤er because
he wish for too much? An anonymous rule should not specify who is to blame for this
breakdown, except if the rule itself computes what the right o¤er must be; but in that
case the rule determines directly the right outcome without the help of the players. The
HM-model identies the proposer as being the only player responsible for the lack of
agreement, giving him a chance (1  ) to live the game after a rejected proposal.
In this paper we show that it is possible to yield strategic support for single-valued
NTU-solutions, by changing the breakdown procedure, in such a way that, after rejec-
tion, the probability of leaving the game will be the same for all players (proposer and
responders), making all of them responsible for the lack of agreement. There are several
ways in which this can be done. We show two of them, which di¤er from the HM-model
only in the rules of breakdown.
The simplest way to make this type of modication was already mentioned in Hart and
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Mas-Colell (1996a), Section 6. There, they propose several modications of the bargaining
procedure, and this is the case (d) from their list:
- Random removal. All players (proposer and responders) drop out with equal proba-
bility. The player that leaves the game receives a payo¤ of zero, and the rest restart the
bargaining process.
The authors mention that in the TU-case The resulting solution is di¤erent from the
previous ones (thus, it is neither the Shapley value nor the equal split solution6). However,
for a large n, it is easy to see that it is close to the equal split solution.
Nevertheless, the interest of this modication relapses into the solution obtained in
the NTU-case. It satises both requirements mentioned above: Single-valuedness and
symmetry. Moreover, it yields the Nash bargaining solution in pure bargaining games,
and the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik (1994) in TU-games.
The second modication proposed is a bit more elaborate, but has the advantage that
the solution obtained ts into the Shapley value generalization program.
- Random marginal. A new proposer is chosen (among all of them) with equal proba-
bility. The proposer makes an ultimatum o¤er. If the rest of the players agree, this o¤er
is the nal payo¤. If any player rejects, the proposer drops out of the game (receiving
zero) and we restart the bargaining process with the remaining players.
Thus, in the ultimatum o¤er, the proposer knows for sure that they will leave the game
in case of rejection. The di¤erence between the random removal and random dictator is
that, in random removal the player selected leaves the game directly, and in the random
dictator, the player selected makes an o¤er, and it is only under rejection that the player
leaves the game.
Now, the resulting solution supported by this bargaining procedure yields a new so-
6That is, the payo¤s are shared equally beween the players of the coalition.
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lution in the NTU-case that it is again single-valued, and satises symmetry. When we
deal with TU-games the Shapley value is selected, and in Hyperplane games it is the Con-
sistent NTU-value. The price to pay relies on the fact that in pure bargaining problems
the solution obtained is di¤erent from the Nash bargaining solution. The point selected
is the maximization of utility gains from a breakdown point, so it is similar to the Nash
solution (maximization of utility gains from the disagreement point), and the breakdown
point is an average of the ideal points, from which the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution
is based. So it has elements of both solutions in its denition.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 is devoted to preliminary denitions and nota-
tions. Section 3 presents the bargaining model of Hart and Mas-Colell and the modica-
tions that yield the random marginal and the random removal bargaining models. The
proposals corresponding to an equilibrum, for both bargaining models, are characterized
in NTU-games. In Section 4 some two-person games are used to see the similarities and
di¤erences of the limit points associated to these models. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted
to the characterization of the random marginal and random removal values in TU-games
an NTU-games respectively. Finally, Section 7 explores in large games the connections
between the random marginal value and the Shapley NTU-value, and between the random
removal value and the equal split value.
2 Denitions
Let N = f1; :::; ng be a nite set of players. A coalition is a subset of N . let P (N) be the
set of all coalitions of N . The cardinality of a coalition S is denoted by s. If x; y 2 RN ,
we write x  y if xi  yi for all i 2 N , and x > y if xi > yi for all i 2 N . Given two
vectors x; y 2 RN , we use the notation x  y := Pi2N xiyi, and x  y := (xiyi)i2N . If
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x 2 RN and ; 6= S  N , we write xS as the restriction of x to S, i.e., xS = (xi)i2S 2 RS.
Let RN+ := fx 2 RN j x  0g and RN++ := fx 2 RN j x > 0g. Let A  RN , A is called
comprehensive if A   RN+  A. The boundary of A is denoted by @A. We say that the
boundary is non level if for all x 2 @A it holds that fxg   RN+ \ @A = fxg.
A non-transferable utility game (NTU-game for short), is a map V assigning to each
coalition S, ; 6= S  N , a subset V (S)  RS of attainable payo¤ vectors for players in S.
several regularity conditions are imposed such as:
(A.1) V (S) is non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive.
(A.2) @V (S) is non level.
(A.3) 0 2 V (S) and V0(S) := V (S) \ RS+ is bounded.
(A.4) Monotonicity: V0(S) f0TnSg  V0(T ) whenever S  T:
(A.5) Positively smoothness: For each S  N , at each x of @V (S) there exists a unique
supporting hyperplane to V (S) (i.e. V (S)  fy 2 RS :   y    xg) such that  2 RS++:
The assumption A.4 is just the extension on NTU-games of the classical Monotonicity
assumption for TU-games. The class of all games that satisfy A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4, is
denoted by G:
For each i 2 N , let ri := maxfx : x 2 V (i)g, and let r = (ri)i2N 2 RN . Some relevant
classes of NTU-games are:
1. Transferable utility games (TU-games), when for each coalition S there is a number
v(S) such that V (S) = fx 2 RS : Pi2S xi  v(S)g for all S  N . Risk neutral players
who use a totally divisible good to make the coalitional payo¤s is an example of this type
of games. If V is a TU-game, it will be denoted also by v.
2. Hyperplane games (H-games), when @V (S) is a hyperplane for all S  N . That
is, for each coalition S there exists a number v(S) and a vector S 2 RS++ such that
V (S) = fy 2 RS : S  y  v(S)g: For example, prize games can be modeled in this way:
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Each coalition S  N has a prize S. The prize S is indivisible, and only one member
of S can receive it. The feasible set of each coalition S consists of all lotteries over which
players in S get the prize S (for more details see Hart, 1994).
3. Pure Bargaining games (PB-games), when 0 2 @V (S), for all S 6= N . Pure
Bargaining games are usually described by a pair (0; V (N)), where V (N) is the utility
feasible set attainable by unanimity agreements of all members of N , and 0 is the utility
feasible payo¤s vector obtained in case of disagreement. The fact that no other than the
grand coalition can make agreements is precisely reected by 0 2 @V (S), for all S 6= N .
Remark. In the normalization assumption A.3, it is worth noting that we have been
making the implicit assumption that the utilities are previously normalized in such a way
that when any player leaves the game, the payo¤ that it obtains is zero. The payo¤ ri is
what player i obtains in the game if the remaining Nni players have left the game. Hence
a two-person NTU-game will be a pure bargaining game only when r = 0.
A payo¤ conguration is a family x =(xS)SN where xS 2 RS for all S  N . A value
on G is a function  that assigns a unique payo¤ conguration to each game belonging
to G. Given V 2 G, and S  N , the vector S(V ) is called the value of V for S: A
solution on G is a mapping 	 that assigns a set of payo¤ congurations to each game
belonging to G. For notational simplicity, we use Sni and S [ i instead of Snfig and
S [ fig respectively.
3 The bargaining model
We describe here the multilateral bargaining procedures, based on the random removal
and random marginal approach, within the general setting of NTU-games. These two
approaches are based on the HM-model, and hence have a similar structure. For this
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reason, in order to see more clearly the di¤erences and similarities between them, we
describe the three models at the same time.
We specify now the sequential noncooperative games which specify the rules of bar-
gaining. The three models only di¤er in what happens if breakdown occurs7.
Let an NTU-game V 2 G and 0   < 1 be a xed parameter:
In each round there is a set S  N of active players, and a proposer i 2 S. In
the rst round, the active set is S = N . The proposer is chosen at random out
of S, with all players in S being equally likely to be selected. The proposer
makes a feasible o¤er aS;i 2 V (S). If all members of S accept it -they are
asked in some prespecied order- then the game ends with these payo¤s. If
it is rejected by even one member of S, then, with probability , we move to
a next round where the set of active players is again S and, with probability
1  , breakdown occurs.
HM-breakdown: The proposer i drops out -leaves the game, receiving a payo¤
of zero- and we move to a next round where the set of active players becomes
Sni8.
RR-breakdown (random removal): A player j is chosen at random from S to
drop out, being equally likely to be selected, and we move to a next round
where the set of active players becomes Snj.
RM-breakdown (random marginal): A player j is chosen at random from S
to make an ultimatum o¤er, being equally likely to be selected: Proposer j
7We call HM-model of bargaining ( RR-model, RM-model, respec.) when the breakdown follows the
HM-breakdown (RR-breakdown, RM-breakdown, respec.) rule.
8In what follows we write Sni and S [ i for Snfig and S [ fig respectively.
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makes a feasible o¤er uS;j 2 V (S). If all members of S accept it -they are
asked in some prespecied order- then the game ends with these payo¤s. If it
is rejected by even one member of S, then j drops out and we move to a next
round where the set of active players becomes Snj.
The negotiation games have potentially innitely many periods, and with more than
two active players, it is well known that many subgame perfect equilibria strategies appear.
Hence, as usual, we restrict ourselves to considering only stationary strategies. Therefore,
the choice at each stage only depends on the set of active players S and on the current
proposer i. Given a prole of stationary strategies, denoted by aS;i(), for i 2 S  N , the
proposal when the set of active players is S and the proposer is i. The average of these
proposals is dened by aS() := (1=s)
P
i2S aS;i()
9.
We recall rst the equations that characterize the stationary subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SP) of the HM-model (Proposition 1, Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996a).
Proposition 1 The proposals corresponding to an SP equilibrium are always accepted,
and they are characterized by:
(HM.1) aS;i() 2 @V (S) for all i 2 S  N ,
(HM.2) ajS;i() = a
j
S() + (1  )ajSni() for all i; j 2 S  N with i 6= j.
Moreover, these proposals are nonnegative.
The proposition says that i makes o¤ers such that they will obtain their maximum
payo¤ compatible by giving to the rest of players what they would expect to obtain in the
continuation of the game if the o¤er were rejected, i.e., for every responder j 6= i, they
will get their expected payo¤ ajS() when the active player set is S again, with probability
9We denote the cardinality of a nite set Sby s:
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, and ajSni() when the active player set is Sni, with probability (1   ) of i dropping
out.
In the next two propositions we characterize the conditions of an SP equilibrium in
the RR and RM-breakdown models. They only di¤er in what players can expect to get
in the continuation of the game in case of breakdown.
For any S  N , dene
djS() :=
1
s
X
k2Snj
ajSnk(); j 2 S:
Therefore dS() = (1=s)
P
j2S(0; aSnj()), where (0; aSnj()) 2 RS is the payo¤ vector in
which player j drops out receiving 0, and players k 6= j receive akSnj().
Proposition 2 The proposals corresponding to an SP equilibrium in the RR-breakdown
model are always accepted, and are characterized by:
(RR.1) aS;i() 2 @V (S) for all i 2 S  N ,
(RR.2) ajS;i() = a
j
S() + (1  )djS() for all i; j 2 S  N with i 6= j.
Moreover, these proposals are nonnegative.
For the RM-breakdown model the proposition is very similar. For any S  N , we
dene uS() := (1=s)
P
j2S uS;j(), where uS;j() 2 RS is the ultimatum o¤er when player
j 2 S is selected as proposer in the RM-breakdown.
Proposition 3 The proposals corresponding to an SP equilibrium in the RM-breakdown
model are always accepted, and are characterized by:
(RM.1) aS;i() 2 @V (S) for all i 2 S  N ,
(RM.2) ajS;i() = a
j
S() + (1  )ujS() for all i; j 2 S  N with i 6= j,
(RM.3) uS;i() 2 @V (S) for all i 2 S  N ,
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(RM.4) ujS;i() = a
j
Sni() for all i; j 2 S  N with i 6= j.
Moreover, aS()  uS(), and aiS;i()  uiS()  0, for all i 2 S  N .
The proof of Propositions (RR) and (RM) are rather similar of the HM-model (see
Proposition 1, in Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996a). In particular, Proposition (RR) is just
case (d) of proposition 9, of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). So we will pay attention only
to the RM-model.
Proof. It is proceeded by induction. It can be easily checked for the 1-player case.
Let (aS;i(); uS;i()), for i 2 S  N , be the proposals of a given SP equilibrium. Assume
by induction hypothesis that RM.1-RM.4 are satised for S 6= N . We see rstly that,
in case of breakdown, uS;i() satises RM.3 and RM.4 for any i 2 N . Because it is
assumed that aS;i() 2 @V (S) and aS;i()  0 for i 2 S 6= N , monotonicity and convexity
imply that aS() 2 V0(S) for all S 6= N . Let i 2 N be the proposer of an ultimatum
o¤er in case of breakdown. Because players j in Nni can guarantee ajNni() by rejection,
they only accept o¤ers such that ujN;i()  ajNni(). Hence the best player i can do is to
o¤er ujN;i() = a
j
Nni() for all j 2 Nni. Let uiN;i() be such that uN;i() 2 @V (N). by
Monotonicity it holds that uiN;i()  0. if uiN;i() > 0, the best player i can do is to o¤er
uN;i(), which will be accepted by all j 2 Nni. If uiN;i() = 0, player i is indi¤erent between
o¤ering uN;i(), which will be accepted, and o¤ering a di¤erent proposal bN;i() 6= uN;i()
such that biN;i() > 0. In this latter case, some player j 6= i must necessarily have
bjN;i() < a
j
Nni(), because A.1 and A.2 imply that @V (N) coincides with the Pareto
frontier of V (N), therefore bN;i() will be rejected by player j. In both cases i will obtain
0 and the rest of the players j 2 Sni obtain ajNni(), which again coincides with uN;i()10.
Let uN() := (1=n)
P
i2N uN;i(), by construction uN;i() 2 @V0(N) for all i 2 N , then
uN() 2 V0(N) by convexity.
10In this indi¤erent case, mixed strategies also yield the same outcome.
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Denote by cN the expected payo¤ vector for the members of N: By convexity it must
be cN 2 V (N), and also cN() + (1   )uN() 2 V (N). Dene the vector dN;i() such
that dN;i() 2 @V (N) and djN;i() = cjN() + (1   )ujN() for all j 2 Nni. Thus,
diN;i()  ciN() + (1   )uiN(). For j 6= i, djN;i() is the expected payo¤ of j following
a rejection of is proposal. therefore dN;i() is the best proposal that will be accepted
if i is the proposer. Moreover, any proposal of i which is rejected yields to i at most
ciN() + (1   )uiN()  diN;i(). Hence, player i will propose aN;i() = dN;i() and the
proposal will be accepted, and therefore cN() = aN(). To see that aN()  uN()
note that the following strategy will guarantee to any i a payo¤ of at least uiN(): accept
only if o¤ered at least uiN(), and, when proposing, propose uN(). This implies that
aiN()  uiN(), and then aiN;i()  aiN() + (1  )uiN()  uiN(). Given the strategies
of the other players, i can not increase their payo¤ from proposals that are accepted, and
making proposals that were systematically rejected they could only yield the chance to go
to the breakdown stage, which gives uN() as expected payo¤s. Whereas the suggested
strategies yields aN() which is a better outcome (aN()  uN()).
4 A two-person example
In the rst example we illustrate the problem in which players can be involved when they
follow a solution concept that does not satisfy the uniqueness requirement.
Let us suppose there are two players who both claim an indivisible good. In addition,
assume that this good can be owned either by only one player or shared by both simul-
taneously. The players have the same preferences and they are risk neutral. The set of
pure feasible outcomes is A = fO1; O2; S; Eg, where Oi (i = 1; 2) means that the good is
only for player i, S means that the good is shared by both players, and E means that the
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good is for nobody. We normalize the utilities as follows:
u1(O1) = u2(O2) = 75;
u1 (S) = u2(S) = 50;
u1(E) = u2(E) = u1(O2) = u2(O1) = 0:
Here the set of players is N = f1; 2g and the characteristic function V is built as
follows: If a player renounces their claim, they leavethe game, and then the good is for
the other, hence
V (fig) = fx : x  rig where ri = 75; i 2 N:
When both players claim for the good, they can either agree on any pure outcome in
A, or on any lottery in A (for example, tossing a coin to decide if the good is only for
player i or j:

O1; p1 =
1
2
;O2; p2 =
1
2

). Therefore the feasible expected payo¤s that both
claimants can guarantee by cooperation are established by the convex hull of u(A) =
f(50; 50); (75; 0); (0; 75); (0; 0)g. Therefore,
V (N) = conv(u(A))  R2+;
(convdenotes convex hull). The sets V () are also comprehensive (utility is freely
disposable). V (N) is represented in Figure 1.
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Three solution points.
Now applying the Consistent NTU-solution to this example, the solution selects three
possible outcomes: a = (56:25; 37:5), b = (37:5; 56:25), and c = (50; 50)11.
Apply now the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) bargaining procedure to our example.
The equilibrium equations which determine the proposals in N are xN;i() 2 @V (N), for
all i 2 N , and xjN;i() = xjN() + (1  )rj, for j 6= i, where xN() is the expected vector
payo¤s for coalition N , i.e., xN() = 12xN;1() +
1
2
xN;2():
That is, player i o¤ers to player j just what they will get in the case of rejecting the
proposal: xN() in case the game repeats, and rj in case breakdown happens, being player
i the only claimant that remains in the game.
11It can easily be checked that these three points also belong to the set of Shapley and Harsanyi
NTU-solutions of this game.
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It can be checked that equations both equations imply that 
x1N;1()  r1
  
x2N;1()  r2

=
 
x1N;2()  r1
  
x2N;2()  r2

,
which, in our example, yield two di¤erent solutions: faN;1(); aN;2()g and fbN;1(); bN;2()g
that, when ! 1, they converge to a and b respectively (see Figure 2).
0
50
50 75
75
a
b
aN,1(r)
aN,2(r)
bN,1(r)
bN,2(r)
Limit points when ! 1.
First, note that this bargaining procedure does not always allow an approximation
to all payo¤ solutions: In our example, point c = (50; 50) is excluded. Secondly, we
have multiplicity: we can approximate either a or b. If we have no previous reasons to
discriminate between claimants 1 and 2, a way to solve this impasse is to choose with a
fair lottery between a and b by tossing a coin. But therefore, the expected payo¤s are
(46:875; 46:875) that are Pareto dominated by (50; 50).
Consider now the two alternative breakdown rules proposed.
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Random removal (RR): Both players have the same probability of living the game. If
player i leaves the game, their payo¤ is zero, and player j receives their claim rj . Therefore
the expected payo¤s vector d is
d =
1
2
(0; r2) +
1
2
(r1; 0) =
1
2
(0; 75) +
1
2
(75; 0) = (37:5; 37:5) :
Random marginal (RM): Both players have the same probability of being the proposer
of an ultimatum payo¤ vector . If player i proposes ui 2 V (N), player j is asked if they
agree or dissent. If agrees, ui is the nal payo¤. If dissents, player i leaves the game,
receiving a payo¤ of zero, and player j receives their claim rj . The equilibrium proposals
ui are characterized by ui 2 @V (N), for all i 2 N; and uji = rj , for j 6= i: Therefore, it
follows that, the expected payo¤s vector u is u = 1
2
u1+ 1
2
u2. In our example, if a proposer
i is compelled to make an ultimatum o¤er to j, they must o¤er rj = 75 units, because
this is what the other claimant would obtain if the proposer is forced to leave the game
in case of rejection. Hence the expectations are
u =
1
2
(0; 75) +
1
2
(75; 0) = (37:5; 37:5) :
Therefore, in this particular example, the breakdown expected payo¤s d and u coincide,
and we denote this point (37:5; 37:5) by h. It follows that in both bargaining models, the
equilibrium equations which determine the proposals in N are xi () 2 @V (N), for all
i 2 N , and xji () = xjN() + (1  )hj, for j 6= i, where xN() = 12xN;1() + 12xN;2(). It
can be easily checked that 
x1N;1()  h1
  
x2N;1()  h2

=
 
x1N;2()  h1
  
x2N;2()  h2

= (2 )  x1N()  h1  x2N()  h2 .
Therefore, when ! 1, we have ci ()! c () for i = 1; 2, and c ()! c = (50; 50) Hence,
we fall into the classical approach to the Nash Bargaining solution from the disagreement
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point h, which, in our example, is the point that maximizes the product of the utility
gains from the reference point h (see Figure 3).
(0,0) (75,0)
(0,75)
c
h
a2(r)
a1(r)a (r)
Limit point in the random marginal and random removal models.
Although in this example our procedure yields, in the limit, a point that belongs to
the set of Consistent NTU-value allocations, i.e. the point c = (50; 50), this fact is not
true in general, as can be seen in the following two examples.
In the pure bargaining game of Figure 4, the random marginal model yields at the
limit the point  = (60; 40) that maximizes the product of utility gains taken from the
breakdown point u = (50; 30). The random removal model yields in the limit the Nash
solution (which coincides with the Shapley, Harsanyi and Consistent NTU-value), i.e.,
point N = (50; 50) that maximizes the product of utility gains from disagreement point
d = (0; 0).
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u 2
u 1
u
N
z
50
100
60
r=0 50
Di¤erences between the random marginal and the random removal payo¤s.
The following two-person TU-game is an additive game, i.e., v(N) = r1 + r2. The
ultimatum o¤ers of the breakdown random marginal are uN;1 = uN;2 = (r1; r2) = u, and
because u 2 @V (N) it holds that  = u. Within the random removal model, the expected
payo¤s vector in case of breakdown is
d =
1
2
(0; r2) +
1
2
(r1; 0) =
1
2
r;
which yields, in the limit, the bargaining payo¤s
 i =
1
2
ri +
1
2
 
ri + rj
  1
2
ri   1
2
rj

=
3
4
ri +
1
4
rj; i; j 2 N = f1; 2g:
This shows that the solution associated to the random removal model does not satisfy
Additivity in TU-games.
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5 TU-games
In this section we analyze the behavior of the RM and RR breakdown models in the
case of transferable utility games. The results of this section are particular cases of the
results obtained in the next section for NTU-games. Here we nd the main di¤erence of
both models: The RM-model supports the Shapley value, and the RR-model supports the
solidarity value.
Random marginal
Let v be a TU-game. For each coalition S  N and player i 2 S, let
@i(v; S) := v(S)  v(Sni)
be the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S in the TU-game v. The Shapley
value in the game v is the payo¤ conguration ' = ('S(v))sN dened by
'iS(v) =
X
TS
T3i
(s  t)! (t  1)!
s!
@i(v; T ); (i 2 S  N) :
Alternatively, this value can be obtained recursively12 by
'iS(v) =
1
s
@i(v; S) +
X
j2Sni
1
s
'iSnj(v); (i 2 S  N) ; (1)
starting with
'ifig(v) = r
i, for all i 2 N:
In the Proposition (RM) we have seen that the rules of the bargaining guarantee that
the equilibrium payo¤s aS of the negotiation stages will always be greater than or equal
to the breakdown payo¤s uS, for all S  N . This fact implies the next straightforward
Theorem.
12See in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a), the Remark of Section 4..
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Theorem 4 Let (aS(); uS())SN be the equilibrium payo¤s conguration associated to
the RM-breakdown model. Then a() = (aS())SN coincides with the Shapley value for
TU-games, for any .
Proof. Let V be a TU-game. By (RM.3)
P
j2S u
j
S;i() = v(S), for all i 2 S, henceP
j2S u
j
S() = v(S), for all S  N . Moreover, aS;i()  uS(), and
P
j2S a
j
S;i() = v(S),
for all i 2 S; then aS;i() = aS() = uS() and
P
j2S a
j
S() = v(S). Therefore
aiS() =
1
s
uiS;i() +
X
j2Sni
1
s
aiSnj(); (i 2 S):
By (RM.3), (RM.4), and
P
j2Sni a
j
Sni() = v(Sni), we have that
uiS;i() = @
i(v; S):
The payo¤s of the single coalitions f{g, are aifig;i() = ri, for all i 2 N . Thus they are
independent of . This implies that the ultimatum payo¤s for two-player coalitions are
also independent of , and equal to
aiS =
1
2
@i(v; S) +
1
2
ri; (i 2 S = fi; jg) :
By increasing the size of the coalitions, this recursive argument shows that the equi-
librium payo¤s are independent of , and equal to
aiS =
1
s
@i(v; S) +
X
j2Sni
1
s
aiSnj; (i 2 S  N):
Therefore aiS = '
i
S(v) for all i 2 S  N .
Remark. It is interesting to note the di¤erences with the results for the HM-model in
the TU-case. In the HM-model, we have that aS() = 'S(v), and aS;i() ! 'S(v) when
! 1, for all i 2 S  N . It means that in the RM-model there is no di¤erence between
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being the proposer or the responder, whereas in the HM-model this is not the case. So, in
the TU-case, in the RM-model the bargaining part (in which players make proposals and
counterproposals) is irrelevant, because they are strongly determined by the breakdown
part. For this reason, if one wishes to support the Shapley value, the bargaining can
be simplied with only two moves, for each round of active players set S: First choose
randomly a proposer out of S (equally likely). If the proposal is rejected, then randomly
choose again another proposer out of S (equally likely) to make an ultimatum proposal.
If it is rejected, then the proposer drops out of the game and proceed to a new round with
the remaining players as the new active set.
Random removal
Let v be a TU-game. For each coalition S  N , let
@av(v; S) :=
1
s
X
i2S
@i(v; S)
be the average marginal contribution of a player to coalition S in the TU-game v. The
solidarity value in the game v is the payo¤ conguration  = ( S(v))sN dened by
 iS(v) =
X
TS
T3i
(s  t)! (t  1)!
s!
@av(v; T ); (i 2 S  N) :
This value was introduced in Nowak and Radzik (1994). Similarly to the Shapley
value, it can be easily checked that this value can be obtained recursively by
 iS(v) =
1
s
@av(v; S) +
X
j2Sni
1
s
 iSnj(v); (i 2 S  N) ;
starting with
 ifig(v) = r
i, for all i 2 N:
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Theorem 5 Let (aS())SN be the equilibrium payo¤s conguration associated to the
RR-breakdown model. Then a() = (aS())SN coincides with the solidarity value for
TU-games, for any .
Proof. Let V be a TU-game. By (RR.1), for any i 2 S  N , we have
aiS;i() =
0@v(S)  X
j2Sni
ajS;i()
1A ;
then
aiS() =
1
s
aiS;i +
1
s
X
j2Sni
aiS;j();
which yields
saiS() =
0@v(S)  X
j2Sni
ajS;i()
1A+ X
j2Sni
aiS;j():
Applying (RR.2),
saiS() = v(S) 
X
j2Sni
0@ajS() + (1  )1s X
k2Snj
ajSnk()
1A+ X
j2Sni
0@aiS() + (1  )1s X
k2Sni
aiSnk()
1A
= v(S) 
X
j2Sni
ajS()  aiS() 
1  
s
X
j2Sni
X
k2Snj
ajSnk()
+
X
j2Sni
aiS() + a
i
S() +
1  
s
X
j2Sni
X
k2Sni
aiSnk();
which, applying (RR.1) again, yields
saiS() = v(S) 
1
s
X
j2Sni
X
k2Snj
ajSnk() +
s  1
s
X
k2Sni
aiSnk():
Note thatX
j2Sni
X
k2Snj
ajSnk() =
X
k2Sni
akSni() +
X
k2Sni
X
j2Sni;
ajSnk() = v(Sni) +
X
k2Sni
 
v(Snk)  aiSnk()

:
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Then we obtain
saiS() = v(S) 
1
s
X
k2S
v(Snk) +
X
k2Sni
aiSnk() =
1
s
@av(v; S) +
1
s
X
k2Sni
aiSnk():
The payo¤s of the single coalitions f{g, are aifig;i() = v(i), for all i 2 N . So they are
independent of . A recursive argument shows that the average equilibrium payo¤s aiS
are independent of , and equal to
aiS =
1
s
@av(v; S) +
X
k2Sni
1
s
aiSnk; (i 2 S  N):
Therefore aiS =  
i
S(v) for all i 2 S  N .
Remark: Note that as;i () 6= aS, for all i 2 S  N . But, given the assumption (A.3),
condition (RR.2) implies that as;i ()! aS whenever ! 1.
6 NTU-games
In this section we see that the Random marginal and the Random Removal models each
support a single-valued solution in the class of NTU-games.
Random marginal. To characterize the value associated to the RM-model we need
to dene the concept of marginal contributions associated to a payo¤ conguration. Let
V be an NTU-game and let x =(xS)SN be an e¢ cient payo¤ conguration. For each
coalition S containing player i let
@ix(V; S) := max

i 2 R :  xSni; i 2 V (S)	 :
Note that if V 2 G and xS 2 V0(S) for all S  N , @ix(V; S) is well dened and
@ix(V; S)  0. One can interpret this marginal contribution as the maximum that player
i can get in coalition S under the restriction that the others players in S have at their
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disposal the outside option given by xSni. If V is a TU-game, given by the characteristic
function v, for any e¢ cient payo¤ conguration x it holds that @ix(V; S) = @
i(v; S) for all
i 2 S  N .
Remark. The value of the Consistent NTU-solution in Hyperplane games can also
be dened recursively13 by
'iS(V ) =
1
s
@ix(V; S) +
X
j2Sni
1
s
'iSnj(V ); (i 2 S  N) ; (2)
where x =('S(V ))SN , starting with '
i
fig(V ) = r
i, for all i 2 N:
Because @V (S) is a hyperplane, in the RM-model it occurs that uS() 2 @V (S), so
again we have that aS;i() = aS() = uS() as in Theorem (4). Applying the same
arguments as there, we can reproduce for the Consistent NTU-solution in Hyperplane
games the same result that as Theorem (4) yields for the Shapley value in TU-games.
We now proceed to dene the NTU-value supported by the RM-model.
Denition 6 Let V 2 G and a=(aS)SN be a payo¤ conguration. Then a is the RM-
value  of V (i.e., a = (V )) if and only if for each S  N there exists a vector S 2 RS++
such that:
(a) aS 2 @V (S);
(b) S  aS = v(S; S) := maxf S  c : c 2 V (S)g; and
(c) iS (a
i
S   uiS) = jS
 
ajS   ujS

for all i; j 2 S,
where uiS :=
1
s

@ia (V; S) +
P
k2Sni a
i
Snk

for all i 2 S.
Condition (a) states that the payo¤ vector aS is e¢ cient for coalition S. Condition
(b) ensures that aS is also S-utilitarian, i.e., that it maximizes the sum of the S-
rescaled payo¤s. Condition (c) is a S-egalitarian condition: The gains of the players
13See formula (3) in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a).
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in aS with respect to the vector uS are equal relative to the units given by S. The
payo¤ vector uS has the following interpretation: The payo¤ allocation
 
aSni; @ia (V; S)

species the choice of player i 2 S if this player has the dictatorial power to choose for
S, under the restriction that the others players in S have at their disposal aSni. Vector
uS =
1
s
P
i2S
 
aSni; @ia (V; S)

gives the expected payo¤ allocation for players in S if each
member has an equal chance of obtaining this dictatorial power14. Note that condition
(c) can be rewritten as
(c) iS
h
(aiS   @ia (V; S)) +
P
k2Sni 
i
S

aiS   aiSnk
i
=
jS
h 
ajS   @ja (V; S)

+
P
k2Sni 
j
S

ajS   ajSnk
i
, for all i; j 2 S.
Proposition 7 If V 2 G, then the RM-value  of V exists and it is unique. Moreover, if
V is an H-game, then (V ) coincides with the Consistent NTU-value of V , and, if V is a
TU-game, then (V ) coincides with the Shapley value of V .
Proof. First we prove existence and uniqueness. Let a game V 2 G. The payo¤
conguration a = (V ) is built recursively as follows: We start with single coalitions fig,
for all i 2 N , making ifig > 0, and aifig = ri. Then conditions (a), (b), and (c), trivially
hold. Assume by induction hypothesis that the Proposition holds for every T  S. By
convexity of V (S) and monotonicity, it holds that uS 2 V0(S), and the unicity of aSni,
for all i 2 S, determine uS uniquely. If uS 2 @V0(S), making aS = uS, and taking as S
one of the support vectors of V (S) at point aS, the Proposition holds. If uS =2 @V0(S), A
vector aS satises (a), (b), and (c), if and only if
aS := argmax
Y
i2S
xuS
x2V0(S)
 
xi   uiS

;
14See the interpretation of the Conditional Random Dictatorship axiom used in de Clippel, Peters and
Zank (2004) for the characterization of the Consistent NTU-solution.
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where in that case S must be collineal to the vector

1
aiS uiS

i2S
, and point aS is unique.
When V is an H-game, or a TU-game, it holds that all uS 2 @V0(S), for all S  N , and
therefore aS = uS. Hence, formulas (2) and (1) apply to yield the Consistent and the
Shapley values respectively.
We now establish the main result of this Section.
Theorem 8 Let V 2 G be an NTU-game. Then for each 0   < 1 there is an SP
equilibrium of the RM-model. Moreover, if V satises the additional assumption (A.5),
when ! 1, every SP equilibrium payo¤ conguration a() converges to a = (V ).
Proof. Existence.
Assume that V 2 G: We prove the existence following a recursive argument. Given
0   < 1, let aifig;i() = uifig;i() := ri 2 V0(fig), for all i 2 N . Therefore, for single
coalitions, (RM.1)-(RM.4) are satised.
Assume that we have already determined (aS;i; uS;i) for all i 2 S ( N . Let uN;i()
be dened by uN;i() 2 @V (N) and ujN;i() := ajNni (), for all j 6= i, where aNni () :=
1
n 1
P
k2Nni aNni;k (). Because aNni () 2 V0(Nni), by Monotonicity it holds that uN;i() 2
V0(N), and then (RM.3) and (RM:4) are satised. Dene uN() := 1n
P
i2N uN;i (), then,
by Convexity, uN() 2 V0(N).
If uN() 2 @V0(N), making aN;i () := uN(), for all i 2 N , conditions (RM.1) and
(RM.2) are trivially satised.
If uN() =2 @V0(N), dene V (uN(); N) := V0(N) \
 
uN() + RN+

. Therefore, (A.1)
and (A.3) imply that V (uN(); N) is a non-empty, compact and convex set. Dene
n functions i(b), i 2 N , from V (uN(); N) into itself by letting i(b) be dened by:
i(b) 2 @V (uN(); N) and ji (b) := bj+(1  )ujN(), for all j 6= i. By Non-levelness and
(A.1), i is well-dened and continuous. By convexity of V (uN(); N), function  () :=
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1
n
P
i2N i(b) is a continuous function that maps V (uN(); N) into itself. Therefore,
by the browers xed point theorem, there is a vector a() 2 V (uN(); N) satisfying
a() =  (a()). By construction, letting aN;i() := i(a()), i 2 N , (RM.1) and (RM.2)
are satised.
In this recursive way we prove the existence of payo¤conguration proposals (aS;i () ; uS;i ())i2SN
which satisfy (RM.1)-(RM.4) and, by Proposition (RM), they correspond to an SP equi-
librium.
Convergence.
Consider a convergence sequence frg ! 1 when r !1. Let

(aS;i(r) ; (uS;i(r)i2SN
	  Y
SN
V0(S)
!2
be their associated SP equilibrium proposals. Because
 Y
SN
V0(S)
!2
is
a compact set, it must be a subsequence f0rg such that

(aS;i(
0
r) ; (uS;i(
0
r)i2SN
	 !
(aS;i) ; (uS;i)i2SN
	
. By the compactness assumption, let (M; :::;M) 2 RS+ be an upper
bound of V0(S); then
ajS;i ()  ajS ()  M(1   ) for all i; j 2 S, and all S  N .
Therefore, in the limit, it holds that aS;i = aS, for all i 2 S  N .
Suppose now that V satises also the smoothness assumption (A.5). Let

(aS) ; (uS)SN
	
be the limit payo¤ conguration as before, where uS = 1s
P
i2S uS;i, for all S  N .
First, note that aifig = r
i, then it trivially holds that afig = fig (V ), for all i 2 N .
Let a coalition S  N , with s  2. Let S() 2 RS++ be dened either by an outward
normal to @V (S) if uS() 2 @V (S), or by the vector

1
aiS() uiS()

i2S
if uS() =2 @V (S)
(note that in this case aiS;i () > u
i
S () for all i 2 S, and then aiS () > uiS ()). Therefore,
all aiS;i (), i 2 S, belong to the hyperplane HS() dened by
HS() :=

c 2 RS : S()  c = S()  aS ()
	
:
To check this, if uS() 2 @V (S), this holds by denition of S(). If uS() =2 @V (S), we
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have that
aiS;i () = sa
i
S () 
X
j2Sni
aiS;j () = sa
i
S () 
X
j2Sni
 
aiS ()  (1  )uiS ()

= (s   (s  1))  aiS ()  uiS ()+ uiS () :
hence,
S()  aS;i () =
aiS;i ()
aiS ()  uiS ()
+
X
j2Sni
ajS;i
ajS ()  ujS ()
= (s   (s  1)) + u
i
S ()
aiS ()  uiS ()
+
X
j2Sni

 
ajS ()  ujS ()

+ ujS ()
ajS ()  ujS ()
= s+
X
j2S
ujS ()
ajS ()  ujS ()
= S()  aS;j () , for all i; j 2 S:
Denote by S() = S()  1P
i2S 
i
S()
. Since aS;i () ! aS, by smoothness of @V (S),
we have that S()! S, where S is the outward unit length normal to @V (S) at aS15;
S being collineal to the vector

1
aiS uiS

i2S
when uS =2 @V (S). Therefore, for S, aS, and
uS, conditions (a), (b), and (c), of Denition (6) are satised.
The unicity of the limit payo¤ conguration

(aS) ; (uS)SN
	
follows by a straight-
forward induction argument. Because aifig = r
i, for all i 2 N , the breakdown payo¤s uS
are uniquely determined for all S  N , such that s = 2. This implies the uniqueness of
limit points aS, for coalitions of size s = 2. This fact implies again the uniqueness of limit
points uS, and hence the uniqueness of limit points aS, for coalitions of size s = 3, and so
on and so forth up to the grand coalition N .
Remark. Asymmetric solutions can be easily dened. We need only assume that the
proposers are chosen to be the proposer with di¤erent probabilities. Let w 2 RN++ be a
15Note here that for jS  3j the set of equilibrium o¤ers aS;i() is not necessarily a singleton; and
without smoothness on @V (S), the convergence to S(V ) may fail too. See Prooposition 8.1, and Remark
3, in Section 8, of Thomson and Lensberg (1989).
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vector of weights, and assume that the proposers are chosen in proportion to these weights.
In particular, when V is an H-game, it holds that the asymmetric solution coincides with
the weighted Shapley (1953) value for TU-games (see Kalai and Samet, 1985; and Hart
and Mas-Colell, 1989), and with the weighted Consistent NTU-value for H-games (See
Maschler and Owen, 1989; and Calvo, García and Zarzuelo, 2001).
Random removal. The solidarity value in NTU-games can be dened as follows.
Denition 9 Let V 2 G and a=(aS)SN be a payo¤ conguration. Then a is the Soli-
darity value  of V (i.e., a =  (V )) if and only if for each S  N there exists a vector
S 2 RS++ such that:
(a) aS 2 @V (S);
(b) S  aS = v(S; S) := maxf S  c : c 2 V (S)g; and
(d) iS (a
i
S   diS) = jS
 
ajS   djS

for all i; j 2 S,
where diS :=
1
s
P
k2Sni a
i
Snk for all i 2 S.
Condition (d) is also a S-egalitarian type condition. The di¤erence with condition
(c) of the random marginal value lies in the denition of the breakdown point dS. The
vector dS = 1s
P
i2S
 
aSni; 0

gives the expected payo¤ allocation for players in S if each
member has an equal chance of dropping out of the game, obtaining a zero payo¤.
Parallel results of the random marginal approach can be obtained for the solidarity
value.
Denition 10 If V 2 G, then the solidarity value  of V exists and it is unique. More-
over, if V is a TU-game, then  (V ) coincides with the solidarity TU-value of V .
Theorem 11 Let V 2 G be an NTU-game. Then for each 0   < 1 there is an SP
equilibrium of the RR-model. Moreover, if V satises the additional assumption (A.5),
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when ! 1, every SP equilibrium payo¤ conguration a() converges to a =  (V ).
The proofs are fully identical to the RM-model, interchanging the roles of uS by dS,
hence they are left to the reader.
Remark. The solidarity value has an interesting link with the equal split solution,
relative to (0; :::; 0). In Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a) this solution is obtained as one of
possible variations of the breakdown technology. In particular, as they point out in Case
(b): Only the responders (but not the proposer) drop out, all with equal probability. This
solution can be dened in NTU-games as follows.
Denition 12 Let V 2 G and a=(aS)SN be a payo¤ conguration. Then a is the equal
split value  of V (i.e., a = (V )) if and only if for each S  N there exists a vector
S 2 RS++ such that:
(a) aS 2 @V (S);
(b) S  aS = v(S; S) := maxf S  c : c 2 V (S)g; and
(e) iSa
i
S = 
j
Sa
j
S for all i; j 2 S.
Note that if V is a TU-game, then aiS =
v(S)
s
, for all i 2 S  N . Hart and Mas-Collel
mention that, in TU-games, the solidarity value approaches, for a large n, the equal split
value. We will conrm this assertion for large NTU-games in the next Section.
Remark. The properties of Uniqueness and Symmetry are the main motivation
of the paper. By Uniqueness we mean that the payo¤ conguration of the solution is
single-valued. This property is important if we consider a solution as a way to nd an
agreement when an alternative must be chosen over a set that produces a di¤erent rank
of preferences. This lack of unanimity is not solved when a solution selects a subset
of alternatives, because we again have the same ranking problem among players, but
now over the subset selected. The example of Section 2 shows that neither the Shapley,
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Harsanyi and Consistent NTU-values satisfy this requirement16.
A TU-game (N; v) is said to be symmetric when the worth of a coalition is a function
of its size, i.e. v(s) = f(jSj). A Pure Bargaining game (d; V (N)) is symmetric if d1 =
d2 = ::: = dn, and for any bijection  : N ! N , and for each x 2 V (N) it holds that
x 2 V (N), where x =  x(i)i2N . We extend the denition of Symmetry for NTU-
games as follows: (N; V ) is symmetric if (i) ri = rj for all i; j 2 N , and (ii) for any two
S; T  N , such that jSj = jT j  2, for any bijection  : S ! T , and any x 2 V (S), it
holds that x 2 V (T ) (note that the case S = T is included). We say that a solution
satises Symmetry if it selects symmetric payo¤s when the game V is symmetric, i.e.
for every x 2 	(V ), xiS = xjS for all i; j 2 S  N . Because the Nash solution satises
symmetry for Pure Bargaining games, and given the way in which the random marginal
and the solidarity NTU-values are built, it can be checked that they also satisfy Symmetry
in G.
A full axiomatic characterization of these new solutions is not yet accomplished, and
should be the object of further research.
7 Large games
The aim of this Section is a study of how the random marginal and the solidarity values
should behave in large games with non-transferable utility. More specically, we will
consider only di¤erentiable market games for which the Value equivalence theorem holds
(Aumann, 1975); that is, the equivalence between the value allocations and the core
allocations. The basic references and results in this topic can be found in Hart (1994, and
2001).
16For the Consistent NTU-value a three-person example of non unicity can be found in Owen (1994).
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We restrict our analysis to the case of continuum games with nitely many types of
players, where each coalition is characterized by its composition. Let N = f1; :::; ng be
the set of types. The prole of a coalition is a vector x 2 RN+ , where xi is the mass
of players of type i in the coalition. The game form will specify the sets of feasible
payo¤ vectors for all coalitions. We consider only type-symmetric imputations, where
all players of the same type get the same payo¤17. For every x 2 RN+ , let V (x) 
RN be the set of feasible per-capita payo¤ vectors for a coalition with prole x. This
point-to-set map V is called the NTU-game form. Given V we dene also the set of
feasible total per-type payo¤s by V^ (x) := fx  a : a 2 V (x)g, for all x 2 RN+ . Dene
v^(x; ) := sup f  (a  x) : a 2 V (x)g  sup
n
  b : b 2 V^ (x)
o
. v^(x; ) is the continuum
TU-game associated to V with utility comparison weights . We will make the following
assumptions:
(C.1) Standard: For every x 2 RN+ , V (x) is a non-empty and strict subset of RN , it
is closed , convex, comprehensive and non-level. V0(x) := V (x) \ RN+ is non-empty and
bounded.
(C.2) Super-additivity: V^ (x) + V^ (y)  V^ (x+ y) for every x; y 2 RN+ .
(C.3) Homogeneity: V (tx) = V (x) for every x 2 RN+ and t > 0 (in terms of total
payo¤s, V^ (tx) = tV^ (x)).
(C.4) Di¤erentiability: For any  2 RN++, the gradientrxv^(x; ) exists for all x 2 RN++.
rxv^(x; ) is uniformly bounded and uniformly positive for every bounded subset of RN++.
Moreover v^(x; ) is C2 on its domain.
Assumptions C.1, C.2, and C.3 are standard for market games. For example, a pure
exchange economy where each type i possesses a utility function ui concave and non-
17Because the random marginal value yields the same payo¤s to substitute players, this is not a real
restriction.
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decreasing, with the slope everywhere bounded away from 0 and innity, and ui(!i) = 0
(where !i is the initial endowment), yields a market game satisfying C.1-C.3. Di¤eren-
tiability allows us to set the condition that characterizes the RM-value in terms of a rst
order partial di¤erential equations system.
Remark. Note that the di¤erentiability of v^(x; ) implies both the smoothness of
@V (x), and the strict convexity of V (x). Therefore there is a unique a 2 V (x) such
that   (a  x) = v^(x; ). Conversely, for any a 2 @V (x) there is a unique , such that
  (a  x)    (b  x), for all b 2 V (x). That is, there is a unique supporting hyperplane
to V^ (x) at a  x,  being its corresponding outward normal vector.
Random marginal. We now see how the conditions to be a random marginal value will
look for large games. As in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996b), given a continuum game V and
the grand coalition x 2 RN++, we obtain a sequence of nite games Vr, for r = 1; 2; :::; with
the set of players Nr := fi1; :::; irgi2N ; where there is a set of types N , having for each type
i 2 N , r symmetric players, each one being regarded as having a mass of xi
r
. There are in
total #Nr = rn players. For any coalition S  Nr, denote by m(S) := (mi(S))i2N , where
mi(S) is the number of players of type i in S. Let Vr be the set of feasible per-capita type-
symmetric payo¤ vectors; then, for any S  Nr, Vr(S) := V
 
m(S)   1
r
 x. In terms of
total payo¤s, V^r(S) := m(S) 
 
1
r
 x V  m(S)   1
r
 x. In particular, for all r, it holds
that Vr(Nr) = V (x), and V^r(Nr) = xV (x) = V^ (x). We say that Vr is the r-approximation
to the continuum game V . For any S  Nr denote by I(S) := fi 2 N : mi(S) 6= 0g. A per-
capita type-symmetric payo¤ conguration is a family ar =
 
air;S

i2I(S);SNr , where each
of these mi(S) players of type i in coalition S, receives aikr;S = a
i
r;S, for all k = 1; :::;m
i(S).
Our assumptions imply that each nite game V^r has a unique per-capita random
marginal value ar = (Vr), and for every S  Nr it holds that ar;S 2 @Vr(S)\RS+. Given
a continuum game V and coalition x 2 RN++ dene the per capita asymptotic random
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marginal value by a(x) := limr!1 ar;Nr , where ar;Nr is the per capita RM-value for the
grand coalitionNr of the nite game Vr18. Because @Vr(N)\RS+ = @V (x)\RS+ is a compact
set, the existence of such limit points is a guarantee (taken the appropriate subsequence).
Nevertheless, given the uniqueness of ar;Nr for every r, we have the plausible conjecture
that the set of limit points is single valued, and the family of continuum games in which
the value is well dened is still a conjecture.
A very relevant consequence of the uniqueness of the RM-value for each nite approxi-
mation Vr is that if the continuum game V is homogeneous then the asymptotic RM-value,
if it does converge, must also be single-valued and homogeneous. On the contrary, de-
note by a(x) the asymptotic RM-value for the grand coalition x, and suppose that for two
di¤erent t; t0 > 0, it holds that a(tx) 6= a(t0x). By homogeneity, V (x) = V (tx) = V (t0x),
therefore a(tx) and a(t0x) must also be solutions for V at x. Then, for a large enough
r, and for all r  r, there must be ar;Nr close to a(tx), and a0r;Nr close to a(t0x), with
ar;Nr 6= a0r;Nr , which contradicts the uniqueness of the RM-value for nite games.
Let us see the conditions that the per capita RM-value should satisfy on continuum
games. Firstly, for each nite r-approximation Vr and coalition S = Nr, there exists
r;Nr 2 RN++ such that:
(a) ar;Nr 2 @Vr(Nr)
(b)
P
i2N 
i
r;Nx
iair;Nr = maxf
P
i2N 
i
r;Nx
ibi : b 2 Vr(Nr)g;
(c) ir;N
h
air;Nr   @iar (Vr; Nr) + (r   1)

air;Nr   air;Nrnir

+
P
k2Nni r

air;Nr   air;Nrnkr
i
=
jr;N
h 
ajr;Nr   @jar (Vr; Nr)

+ (r   1)

ajr;Nr   ajr;Nrnjr

+
P
k2Nnj r

ajr;Nr   ajr;Nrnkr
i
.
(i; j 2 N) :i
18More general convergence sequences of r-approximations could be dened, for example, by allowing
di¤erent ri s for di¤erent is. But even for this symmetric denition, the limit approach is hard enough.
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Where
@iar (Vr; Nr) := max

i 2 R :  ar;Nrnir ; i 2 Vr(Nr)	 ; (i 2 N):
Taken limits, when r !1, the e¢ cient condition ar;Nr 2 @Vr(Nr) turns into condition
(i) a(x) 2 @V (x).
The -utilitarian condition (b) takes the form
(ii)
P
i2N 
i (x)xiai(x) = max
P
i2N 
i (x)xibi : b 2 V (x)	 = v^ (x;  (x)) :
Note that, under the di¤erentiability assumption, the  (x) associated to a(x) is unique
(up to length normalization).
For the -egalitarian condition (c), the increments
(r   1)  air;Nr   air;Nrnir+ X
k2Nni
r
 
air;Nr   air;Nrnkr

are replaced by derivatives, so they take the form
xi
@ai(x)
@xi
+
X
k2Nni
xk
@ai(x)
@xk
:
Dene i;Nr :=
 
ar;Nrnkr ; @
k
ar (Vr; Nr)

; then, by construction, i;Nr 2 @Vr(Nr) = @V (x).
Let 
 
i;Nr

be its unique associated outward normal vector. Then it holds that
i
 
i;Nr

xi@kar (Vr; Nr) +
X
k2Nni
k
 
i;Nr

xkakr;Nrnir = v^
 
x; 
 
i;Nr

:
When r !1, i;Nr ! a(x) and 
 
i;Nr
! (x). and hence
@kar (Vr; Nr)!
1
i (x)
@v^ (x;  (x))
@xi
:
All together they suggest the following denition:
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Denition 13 Let V be a continuum game with a nite type of players N , satisfying
(C.1), (C.2), and (C.4). Let a(x) be a C1 per capita payo¤ conguration, x 2 RN++. Then
a(x) is a continuum RM-value of V at x, if there exists (x) 2 RN++ such that
(i) a(x) 2 @V (x);
(ii) (x)  (x  a(x)) = v^ (x;  (x)); and
(iii) i(x)

ai(x)  1
i(x)
@v^(x;(x))
@xi
+
P
k2N x
k @a
i(x)
@xk

= j(x)

aj(x)  1
j(x)
@v^(x;(x))
@xj
+
P
k2N x
k @a
j(x)
@xk

,
for all i; j 2 N:
Condition (iii) is a system of rst order partial di¤erential equations, and if the as-
ymptotic RM-value does exist, then it must be a particular solution of (i)-(iii). We now
see the relationship between the asymptotic RM-value and the Shapley NTU-value in
continuum games. The construction of a Shapley NTU-value in continuum games is as
follows (see Shapley, 1969; and Shapley and Shubik, 1969).
Given a continuum game V , and a vector of weights  2 RN++, build the continuum
TU-game v^ (x; ). Under di¤erentiability, the Aumann-Shapley (1974) value of v^ (x; ) is
dened by
'i (v^ (x; )) =
Z 1
0
@v^ (tx; )
@xi
dt; for all i 2 N:
Denition 14 Let V be a continuum game with a nite type of players N , satisfying
(C.1), (C.2), and (C.4). Let a(x) be a per capita payo¤ conguration, x 2 RN++. Then
a(x) is a continuum Shapley NTU-value of V at x, if there exists (x) 2 RN++ such that
(i) a(x) 2 @V (x); and
(iv) (x)  a(x) = ' (v^ (x; (x))).
Assuming homogeneity we have the following result:
Theorem 15 Let V be a continuum game with a nite type of players N , satisfying (C.1),
(C.2), (C.3), and (C.4). Let a(x) be an homogeneous C1 per-capita payo¤ conguration,
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x 2 RN++. Then a(x) is a continuum RM-value if and only if it is a Shapley NTU-value
of V at x.
Proof. Let a(x) be a continuum MR-value of V at x, and assume that it is ho-
mogenous. Because V (x) is homogenous of degree 0, a(x) also has the same degree of
homogeneity. Therefore, by Eulers formula,
P
k2N x
k @a
i(x)
@xk
= 0, and hence condition (iii)
is equivalent to
i(x)ai(x)  @v^ (x;  (x))
@xi
= k; for all i 2 N ,
where k 2 R. By multiplying this expression by xi, and adding it over all i, we have
X
i2N
i(x)xiai(x) 
X
i2N
xi
@v^ (x;  (x))
@xi
=
 X
i2N
xi
!
k:
By condition (ii),
P
i2N 
i(x)xiai(x) = v^ (x;  (x)). And because v^ (x;  (x)) is homo-
geneous of degree 1, by applying Eulers formula again,
P
i2N x
i @v^(x;(x))
@xi
= v^ (x;  (x)).
As
P
i2N x
i > 0, it follows that k = 0, which implies that
i(x)ai(x) =
@v^ (x;  (x))
@xi
, for all i 2 N .
On the other hand, under homogeneity,
' (v^ (x; (x))) =
Z 1
0
@v^ (tx; (x))
@xi
dt =
@v^ (x; (x))
@xi
, for all i 2 N ,
which nally yields
(x)  a(x) = rxv^ (x; (x)) = ' (v^ (x; (x))) .
Because in homogenous and di¤erentiable games the Shapley NTU-value is a homoge-
nous and di¤erentiable mapping, it turns out that it satises conditions (i)-(iii), hence
both values coincide.
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If the continuum game V is non-homogeneous, the RM-value and the Shapley NTU-
value will generally yield di¤erent payo¤s. An alternative way to compare both values is
to consider the equivalent of condition (iii) for the Shapley NTU-value. Recall for nite
games its characterization:
Denition 16 Let V 2 G and a=(aS)SN be a payo¤ conguration. Then aN is the
Shapley NTU-value ' of V if and only if for each S  N there exists a vector S 2 RS++
such that:
(a) aN 2 @V (N);
(b) S  aS = v(S; S); and
(f) iS

aiS   aiSnj

= jS

ajS   ajSni

for all i; j 2 S.
Note that, in the payo¤ conguration a, e¢ ciency (and hence, feasibility) is only re-
quired for the grand coalition N . Condition (f) is the -Balanced Contributions property.
The main drawback of this denition is given by the possible non-feasibility of the threat
points aS, for all S 6= N (except in the TU-case).
By using similar arguments as above, in the continuum, conditions (a) and (b) turn
into (i) and (ii); and condition (f) into
(iv) i(x)@a
i(x)
@xj
= j(x)@a
j(x)
@xi
, for all i; j 2 N .
Conditions (iii) and (iv) can also be compared with condition
(v)
P
j2N 
i(x)xj @a
i(x)
@xj
=
P
j2N 
j(x)xj @a
j(x)
@xi
, for all i 2 N .
This condition, jointly with (i) and (ii), characterizes the Consistent NTU-values in
continuum games (see Owen, 1996, and Leviatan, 2002).
Random removal. The condition (d) for the solidarity value is equivalent to
(d) iS

aiS +
P
k2Sni

aiS   aiSnk

= jS

ajS +
P
k2Sni

ajS   ajSnk

, for all i; j 2 S:
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Therefore, by using similar arguments as for the RM-value, we can dene the solidarity
value in continuum games as follows:
Denition 17 Let V be a continuum game with a nite type of players N , satisfying
(C.1), (C.2), and (C.4). Let a(x) be a C1 per capita payo¤ conguration, x 2 RN++. Then
a(x) is a continuum solidarity value of V at x, if there exists (x) 2 RN++ such that
(i) a(x) 2 @V (x);
(ii) (x)  (x  a(x)) = v^ (x;  (x)); and
(iii) i(x)

ai(x) +
P
k2N x
k @a
i(x)
@xk

= j(x)

aj(x) +
P
k2N x
k @a
j(x)
@xk

, for all i; j 2 N:
Given the uniqueness of the solidarity value for nite games, we can also conjecture
that the asymptotic solidarity value exists and it is single valued. Moreover, in ho-
mogeneous games it must also be a homogeneous value. Hence it implies that, under
di¤erentiability,
P
k2N x
k @a
j(x)
@xk
= 0. For this reason, condition (iii) turns into condition
(vi) i(x)ai(x) = j(x)aj(x), for all i; j 2 N ,
which, jointly with conditions (i) and (ii), characterize the equal split solution for
continuum NTU-games. So, in homogeneous games, both values coincide.
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